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PETER C. BucKI. INTRODUcTION

In 1974, Joel Dolkart ran into serious trouble with the New
York law firm where he was a partner. His colleagues accused him
of siphoning off more than $2.5 million of fees paid to the firm by
Gulf & Western Industries, a major corporate client that Dolkart

had served as "outside general counsel" for sixteen years.'
When the lawyers' accusations led to an eighty-nine-count
criminal indictment, Dolkart told the New York District Attorney
that he had "concrete information about serious misconduct

*Janet J. Higley is an associate at the law firm of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson,
P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina. Ms. Higley received her B.A. in Psychology, with
Distinction, and her Masters in Teaching from the University of Virginia in 199%. She
received her law degree in 2001 from Wake Forest University, where she vas a
member of Order of the Coif, Wake Forest Law Review, and the Moot Court Board.
+ Robert (Robin) C. Jones, Jr. is a partner in the law firm of Robinson, Bradshaw &
Hinson. Mr. Jones received his A.B., magna cum laude with honors in English and
honors in History of Art in 1971 from Yale College, and his J.D. in 19S0 from Yale
Law School. Mr. Jones also attended Balliol College, Oxford University, .,here he
received a B.A. (Hon.) in Jurisprudence with First Class Honours in 1976. From
1980-1998, he practiced at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York City. His practice
areas are corporate finance, banking, mergers and acquisitions, creditors' rights and
workout transactions, leveraged leasing and project finance.
- Peter C. Buck is a partner in the law firm of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson. Mr.
Buck received his Bachelor of Arts degree in business administration from Duke
University in 1969. He received his law degree in 1976 from Duke University, v,here
he was a member of the Order of the Coif and Editor in Chief of the Duke Law
Journal. Mr. Buck served for two years as chairman of the Corporations Committee
of the Business Law Section of the Bar Association and has represented several
financial institutions in connection with regulatory and business matters.
1. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 675, 678q
(D.D.C. 1981).
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committed by officers of prominent corporations., 2
The
prosecutors contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission,
where they encountered "intense interest" in Dolkart and what he
knew,' and eventually entered into a plea agreement promising
Dolkart a recommendation for a probationary sentence in
exchange for his full cooperation with the SEC.4 Dolkart did
cooperate fully, and the SEC launched a three-year investigation
of Gulf & Western's financial affairs that culminated in a civil
complaint charging the company and two of its top executives
with numerous violations of federal securities laws. Gulf &
Western challenged the propriety of the complaint, arguing among
other things that the SEC had "solicited and extracted confidential
and privileged information" from its outside general counsel.5
Gulf & Western lost its argument. Judge Barrington
Parker found the claim of privilege "lacking in support, both
factually and legally." 6 The court stressed that Dolkart "wore
several hats" during his tenure as outside general counsel,
including service as a director, corporate secretary, and a member
of the company's pension advisory committee.'
"Because of
Dolkart's many roles and the large amount of time he spent at
Gulf & Western's offices, it cannot be assumed that all of his
discussions with corporate officials involved legal advice." 8
Moreover, even if some of the challenged communications were
privileged, Judge Parker noted, "[t]he Commission, as protector of
the public interest, could possibly show good cause to justify
disclosure of any privileged information obtained from Dolkart."9
2. Id. It should be noted that Dolkert voluntarily revealed information
seemingly related to the perpetration of a possible fraud on the part of his client.
Thus, while this case generally can be read as a restriction of the attorney-client
privilege, it might be possible to distinguish it on its particular facts.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 677. Gulf & Western also advanced an affirmative defense that "the

Commission deliberately leaked information about its investigation to the New York
Times and aired the matter in the public media," thus "stripping [defendants] of their
due process rights." Id. at 677-78. The court rejected this defense, finding
insufficient evidence that the SEC or its staff was responsible for the leaks. Id. at 685.
6. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 678

(D.D.C. 1981).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 683.
9. Id. at 686.
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Because of Dolkart's unusually close relationship with Gulf
& Western, his case illustrates two issues that should be of great
concern to in-house corporate counsel, and particularly to in-house
counsel in heavily regulated areas such as financial institutions.
First is the danger that the attorney-client privilege will not apply
to communications with a lawyer when he or she is performing
"non-legal" roles for the corporate client. Second is the danger
that a regulatory agency may assert the public policy claim that the
agency's need for information overrides the policies underlying
both the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity.
This article will explore these two major areas of concern
for in-house counsel of financial institutions. Part II provides a
brief background of two of the fundamental protections of
confidentiality for communications with lawyers, the attorneyclient privilege and work product immunity, and the policies that
justify these protections."° Part III explores the application of both
protections to corporations as opposed to individual clients." Part
IV examines the special complications that surface as courts
attempt to apply the privilege and immunity to communications
and work of in-house counsel as opposed to outside law-yers.'2
Part V discusses the special policy concerns that some courts weigh
when examining the application of disclosure bars in the context of
attorneys for regulated industries, particularly financial
institutions. 3 Finally, Part VI sets out some practical issues for
consideration by in-house counsel as they seek to provide the most
effective advice and representation to their employer-clients. 4

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-178 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 179-216 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 217-46 and accompanying text.
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II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK- PRODUCT
IMMUNITY IN GENERAL

A.

The Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest common law
privilege sanctioned by the courts. 15 Its purpose is to encourage
clients to communicate fully and frankly with their attorneys in
order to permit ascertainment of the clients' rights and duties
under the law. 16 Because the privilege has the effect at times of
hindering the courts' quest for evidence and the truth, the privilege
is strictly construed to apply only where necessary to protect its
underlying policy aims.17 The burden of persuading a court that
the attorney-client privilege applies rests on the party asserting the
privilege."8 The Rules of Evidence do not govern the substantive
application of the privilege, but rather incorporate without
comment the privilege as it has developed under common law. 19
The privilege is absolute, and unlike the work product
doctrine, unqualified. 0 Its elements have been set forth in various
ways. One example is Wigmore's classic formulation of the
privilege, which provides that: "(1) [w]here legal advice of any
kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity
as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except the protection be waived."'"
15. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE

§ 87 (5th ed. 1999); Brian M. Smith, Note, Be Carefid How You Use it or

You May Lose it: A Modern Look at CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege and the
Ease of Waiver in Various Circuits,75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 389, 391 (1998).
16. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981).
17. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 87.

18. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984);
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 615 (E.D.N.C. 1992);
N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 515
(M.D.N.C. 1986).
19. FED. R. EVID. 501; N.C. R. EVID. 501.
20. PAUL RICE, AT-TORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.2 (2d

ed. 1999); Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19,35, 229 S.E.2d 191,201 (1976).
21. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 15, §2292 at 554. Under federal common law, the

attorney-client privilege applies only if the following conditions are met:
.The asserted holder of the privilege is, or seeks to become, a client.
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Although the various formulations suggest that the
privilege would apply only to communications from the client to
the attorney, most cases have extended its protection to

oThe person to whom the communication is made is a member of a bar (or the
member's agent), and the member is acting as an attorney in receiving the
communication.
oThe communication relates to a matter of which the attorney is informed by
the client.
oThe communication is made without the presence of third parties.
oThe communication is made for the primary purpose of obtaining legal advice.
oThe communication is not made for the purpose of committing a crime or tort.
oThe privilege is asserted by the party seeking its protection.
Better Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw (In re Allen), 10 F-4d 582, 699 (4th Cir. 1997);
Burroughs Wellcome Co., 143 F.R.D. at 615; N.C. Elce. Membership Corp., 110
F.R.D. at 513. If a party fails to assert the privilege, courts may find the party has
waived it. In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 600; Burroughs Wellcone Co., 143 F.R.D. at 615;
N.C. Elec.Membership Corp., 110 F.R.D. at 513.
In North Carolina, the privilege applies if,
(1) the relation of attorney and client existed at the time the
communication was made, (2) the communication vas made in
confidence, (3) the communication relates to a matter about which
the attorney is being professionally consulted, (4) the
communication was made in the course of giving or seeking legal
advice for a proper purpose although litigation need not be
contemplated, and (5) the client has not vaived the privilege.
State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C. 517, 52-1-24, 444 S.E.2d 438, 442 (1994); State v. Murvin,
304 N.C. 523, 531, 284 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1981); Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,
142 N.C. App. 18, 32,541 S.E.2d 782,791 (2001).
A recent statement of the scope of the privilege is set forth in Rule 502 of the
Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence, which has not been adopted in North Carolina:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client (1) between himself or his representative and
his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, (2) between his lavyer
and the lawyer's representative, (3) by him or his representative or
his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lav,,yer or a
representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending
action and concerning a matter of common interest therein, (4)
between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their
representatives representing the same client.
REv. UNaFOR R. EvID. 502 (1986 amendment); see McCoRMIC, supra note 15, §
87.1.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

270

[Vol. 6

communications from the attorney to the client as well.2" In
essence, then, the privilege requires: (1) a client, (2) a lawyer, (3) a
communication between them, (4) made in confidence, (5) for the
purpose of securing legal advice.2 3 There are several exceptions to
the privilege, perhaps the most important being that the privilege
will not protect communications that can foster an ongoing crime
or fraud. 4
State law governs the application of the privilege in state
courts; interpretations of the scope and application of the privilege
for corporations vary from state to state. 5 Federal courts apply
federal common law to federal claims and, except in diversity
cases, to state law claims in federal court.26 Within the federal
courts, interpretations are far from consistent in many respects.27
B.

Work ProductImmunity Generally

The work product doctrine, first recognized in the United
States Supreme Court case of Hickman v. Taylor,28 is codified in
Rule 26(b)(3) of both the Federal and North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. The federal rule provides as follows:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable [under other
provisions of Rule 26] and prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by
or for that other party's representative.., only
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
22. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see
supra note 15, § 89. See News & Observer Pub. Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C.
465, 482, 412 S.E.2d 7, 31 (1992) (finding "confidential communications between
attorney and client, from either one to the other, are protected by the traditional
MCCORMICK,

attorney-client privilege mandated by common law").
23. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1224 (11th Cir. 1987); JOHN
K. VILLA, CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDELINES § 1.01 (2001).
24. See generally RICE, supra note 20, § 8.
25. Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled
CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 630 (1997); VILLA,
supra note 23, § 1.01.
26. See FED. R. EVID. 501; VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.01.
27. Sherman L. Cohn, The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege and
the No-Contact Rule, 10 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 755-60 (1997).
28. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In
ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation 9
The doctrine generally protects only documents prepared
by an attorney in anticipation of litigation.3' Unlike the attorneyclient privilege, the immunity is qualified: it may be overcome by a
showing that an opposing party has a substantial need for the
materials and that the party would not be able to obtain the
"substantial equivalent" without undue hardship." Mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of an

29. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). The parallel provision in the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure states:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
othervise discoverable under subsection (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of his case and that he is unable vithout undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In
ordering discovery of such materials vwhen the required showing
has been made, the court may not permit disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation in
which the material is sought or work product of the attorney or
attorneys of record in the particular action.
N.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
30. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2023 (2d ed. 1994); VILLA, supra note 23, §
2.05; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOxRRNING LAVYERS § S7 emt. i (1993).
31. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 933-S5
(4th Cir. 1992); see VILLA, supra note 23, § 2.13.
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attorney are, however, afforded special protection that is treated
essentially as an absolute prohibition. 32
The policy rationale of the work product doctrine is not
protection of the attorney-client relationship, but rather
enhancement of the integrity of the litigation process.33 As the
Supreme Court stated in Hickman v. Taylor:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is
bound to work for the advancement of justice while
faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his
clients. In performing his various duties, however, it
is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree
of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel.34
Federal law governs work product issues in all federal court
cases, including diversity cases.35 Most states, including North

32. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavenoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734
(4th Cir. 1974); see Nat' Union Fire Ins. Co., 967 F.2d at 984; VILLA, supra note 23,
§ 2.13. In a recent Second Circuit decision, Doe v. United States, the court upheld a
claim of work-product protection as applied to an attempt to compel an attorney to
"testify to her client's admissions as evidence of his commission of [crimes] .... on
which the attorney was representing him during the interview." Nos. 01-6250, 016251, 01-6252, 2002 WL 253828, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2002). The court noted that to
subpoena the attorney to testify to the observations made in the course of preparing
to represent a client, "in order to help the putative adversary prove the offense as to
which the attorney was providing representation would do substantial injury to the
values that justify the work product doctrine." Id. The court observed that the
prohibition of the compulsion of such testimony "falls comfortably within the black
letter definition of work product." Id. This case seems to indicate that in some
circumstances, not only are documents covered by work-product protection, but
client communications may be as well. Id.
33. VILLA, supra note 23, § 2.01.
34. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). The rationale is that
allowing access to an attorney's trial preparation would be unfair because opposing
counsel with an insight into the other side's preparation and strategy would have an
obvious tactical advantage unrelated to the merits of the case. Id. at 510.
Transparency of preparatory work would also discourage extra effort if it would
benefit the adversary as much as the client. See id. "The work-product doctrine also
protects client interests in obtaining diligent assistance from lawyers. A lawyer
whose work-product would be open to the other side might forgo useful preparatory
procedures ... ." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87
cmt. b (1998).
35. 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, §26.15[5] (2d ed. 1996).
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Carolina, have enacted a state rule of evidence identical or very
similar to Federal Rule 26(b)(3)."
III. ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND

WORK PRODUCT IMMUNITY
FOR CORPORATIONS

A.

Privilegeand the CorporateClient

Courts have almost universally assumed that the attorneyclient privilege is available to corporations, and the principle was
never seriously questioned until 1962, when the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned a federal district court decision that
had held the privilege unavailable to a corporate client."' The
district court had been "convinced that without adequate
decisional precedent or legislative authority [it] should not indulge
extension of the [attorney-client] privilege to a corporation. "'
After reviewing the history of the privilege and its underlying
policy, the Seventh Circuit respectfully disagreed:
We turn now to the application of this deep rooted
privilege-recognized for more than a century as
existing between attorney and client for the benefit
of a natural person-to a corporate client. The
ruling of the district court under scrutiny here is
without precedent. We find nothing improper in the
action of the district court in raising the question.
However, it is obvious to us that no litigant has
heretofore thought there was merit enough in the
proposition to warrant a challenge to the availability
of the privilege to a corporation. That the privilege
has been recognized as available to corporations for

more than a century is not open to serious
question."
36. 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 30, § 2023 at 334-35; sce supra note 29 and

accompanying text.
37. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314,322-23 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied,375 U.S. 929 (1963); see VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.01.
38. Radiant Burners,Inc, 320 F.2d at 318.
39. Id. at 319.
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The policy for the privilege is conceptually the same for
corporate clients as for individual clients: "to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice."4
Although the underlying
considerations are identical, courts and commentators have
frequently expressed the concern that the privilege not be used by
corporations to create a large "zone of secrecy" for
communications whose probative value could be important to a
fair resolution of disputes.4"
The availability of the privilege to corporations as clients
thus appears well settled, and it is very unlikely that a serious
challenge to a corporation's ability to assert the privilege will be
mounted again.42
Still, commentators continue to question
whether corporations should always be able to prevent disclosure
by asserting the privilege:
There is no simple answer to the question of
whether courts should extend the attorney-client
privilege to corporations. This is because the
standards for assessing applicability are not certain,
and empirical bases for applying those standards
have never been proven or disproven. Like so many
other evidence rules, the very existence of the
privilege is based on intuition, instinct, assumptions,
and hunches about the conduct of individuals.43
40. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
41. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D.
Del. 1962); VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.01; David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege
as Applied to Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 953, 956 (1956). Perhaps as a consequence
of this practical concern for abuse, the courts have often emphasized a policy of

encouraging corporations' voluntary compliance with the law as a justification for
applying the privilege to corporations, particularly in the context of internal
corporate investigations. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (observing that compliance with
the many governmental regulations that apply to a corporation may require special
legal expertise); Cohn, supra note 27, at 745-47; RICE, supra note 20, § 4.10.
42. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 87.1; RUSSELL ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON
NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW § 3.03(c), 3-9 to 3-10, n.14 (6th ed. 2000).

43.

RICE,

note 20, § 4.10 at 36; see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy:

The Mythology of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

157 (1993) (arguing that the "myths" upon which the attorney-client privilege is
based should come to an end). As a creature of statute, a corporation has only such

rights and powers as the legislature bestows upon it. Columbus Mills v. Williams, 33
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While it is generally conceded that the privilege for
corporations will not be successfully assaulted as a matter of
principle or underlying policy.' the fundamental concerns about
the propriety of affording such protection to corporate clients will
continue to be debated as courts seek to apply the privilege in
specific circumstances. For example, in Garner v. Wolfinbarger,

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that shareholders in a
derivative action against a corporation should be given the
opportunity to show cause why the privilege should not be

available to a corporation to block disclosure of sensitive
communications between corporate counsel and management. '
The court went "back to basics ' in requiring a balancing of the
important interests at stake: "The privilege must be placed in
perspective. The beginning point is the fundamental principle that

the public has the right to every man's evidence, and exemptions
from the general duty to give testimony that one is capable of
giving are distinctly exceptional. " " The "GarnerDoctrine," %vhich
has become "accepted law,"-4 1 emphasizes the courts' heightened
recognition of conflicting principles in applying the attorney-client
privilege to corporations. "'
The privilege developed historically in cases involving
individual clients, discrete legal problems, and conventional
private practitioners, and its application "to the large and complex

N.C. (11 lred.) 558, 561 (1850) (-[A] corporation is an artificial body. po0s5eing such
powers, and having such capacities, as may be given to it by its maLer."); see
ROBINSON, supranote 42, § 3.01.
44. Id at 38.
45. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970.
46. Id at 1103-04.
47. VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.27.
48. 430 F.2d at 1100.
49. VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.27; see Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979
F.2d 332, 352 n.20 (4th Cir. 1992). Section 55-7-49 of the North Carolina Bu'.ine;
Corporation Act rejects the "Garner Doctrine" for North Carolina corporations: "In
any derivative proceeding, no shareholder shall be entitled to obtain or ha'e acce,;
to any communication w-ithin the scope of the corporation's attorne-clicnt prihilege
that could not be obtained by or would not be accessible to a party in an action other
than on behalf of the corporation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-49 1499); sce ROB
A,ifj%
supra note 42, § 3.03(c) at 3-11.
50. RiCE, supra note 20, § 8.17.
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nature of modern corporate business transactions, 51 has led to
numerous interpretive difficulties." Corporations are "inanimate
entities," which must act through agents, typically individuals, who
speak with the company's lawyers and make decisions based on
legal advice.53 Courts have thus struggled with questions regarding
which corporate "agents" and which communications are covered
by the privilege in various contexts.
Courts have taken different approaches to this question,
depending on whether the privilege is sought to protect
communications from an attorney to representatives of the
corporation or to an attorney by corporate representatives. 4 The
early decisions focused on communications to the attorney and
extended the privilege "expansively" to cover communications by
or from any officer or employee of a client corporation. 5 In 1962,
however, the court in City of Philadelphiav. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,56 considering communications from the attorney to
corporate decision makers, dramatically narrowed the scope of the
privilege by allowing its application only to a "control group"
within a corporation. Under this control group test, only
corporate officers or employees who are in a position to control or
take a substantial part in a decision to be taken on an attorney's
advice could invoke the privilege on behalf of a corporate client. 7
The control group test was widely, though not universally,
applied by the courts for nearly twenty years.5 The test proved
inadequate, however, in protecting communications from
employees, especially lower level employees who could not be
characterized as part of any control group, to counsel in many
situations where the courts deemed such communications worthy
of encouragement.
Courts thus developed a second, more

51. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F. 2d 314, 318 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
52. VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.01; MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 87.1.
53. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 629.
54. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 87.1.
55. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954); MCCORMICK, supra note 15, §87.1.
56. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943.
57. Id.
58. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 87.1.
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expansive, test that extended the privilege to lower echelon
employees so long as the communication related to the subject
matter of the communication." The "subject matter test" has
three major components: (1) the employee's communication must
be at the direction of his or her superior; (2) the communication
must be on the subject matter about which the corporation is
seeking legal advice; and (3) the subject matter must concern the
employee's duties. 0
In 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States
considered this issue in Upjohn Co. v. United States, a case dealing
with a corporate investigation into potential illegal payments by
corporate employees to foreign government officials." Upjohn's
general counsel, directed by the company's chairman to look into
allegations of wrongdoing and to work with outside counsel,
prepared a questionnaire that he sent to all overseas managers in
the corporation.62 The letter advised the managers that the
chairman had asked the general counsel to conduct an
investigation into the payments and instructed the managers to
answer the questionnaires and to treat the investigation as highly
confidential.63 Upjohn later voluntarily reported the illegal
payments to the IRS.64 When the IRS began its own investigation,
it requested the completed questionnaires."5 Upjohn refused to
turn them over, citing the attorney-client privilege."
The Supreme Court decided in favor of Upjohn and
specifically rejected the application of the control group testY
The Court did not, however, expressly adopt the subject-matter
test. Rather, it "eschewed... any bright-line test at all,"" and
adopted instead a "functional" test to be applied on a case-by-case

59. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 4S7, 491-92 (7th Cir.

1970), affd by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971);
1.03[Al.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Cohn, supra note 27, at 750.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 3S83 (1981).
Id. at 3S6-87.
Id. at 387.
Id.
Id. at 3S7-S.

66. Id. at 388; see Cohn. supra note 27. at 752-53.
67. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397.
68. VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.03[B].

VILLA,

supra note 23, §
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basis.69 The Court considered the following factors persuasive in
Upjohn:
• the communications were made by employees to corporate
counsel in order for the corporation to secure legal advice;
" the employees were cooperating with corporate counsel at
the direction of corporate superiors;
" the communications concerned matters within the
employees' scope of employment; and
• the information sought was not available from senior
management who might have been part of Upjohn's control
group.7"
The Upjohn decision "does not... definitively resolve the
issue of whose communications are protected."'" Rather, the
Supreme Court chose a functional, case-by-case analysis that
sacrifices predictability to achieve a weighing of the policy
considerations applicable in each situation. Even in federal cases
in which the courts will apply federal common law, Upjohn leaves
many questions open. For example, courts have not been
unanimous as to whether communications not made at the specific
direction of corporate superiors are covered by the privilege.72
69. Cohn, supra note 27, at 753-54.
70. See VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.03[B].
71. Id.
72. Compare Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, 1993 WL 276081 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1993),
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. h (1998).
The Upjohn "requirement" that the communication concern matters within the scope
of the employee's employment has not always been considered a predicate for
application of the privilege. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 73 cmts. b, d (1998). This issue, however, has been troubling to the
courts and commentators. In Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, the Arizona
Supreme Court faced this issue head-on and formulated its own test because of a
concern that the broad subject-matter approach of Upjohn would privilege
statements of employees who were only witnesses to the conduct at issue, even where
their connection to the liability-causing events was not close enough to fit the
"classical" model of a client. 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993). In that case, communications
to hospital counsel by nurses who had observed, but not participated in, an operation
in which a child's heart had stopped were held not privileged. Id. Although the
nurses had watched the operation in the course of their employment, the court noted,
they were only "witnesses to the event" and their statements thus not afforded the
privilege. Id. at 880. The Arizona court's test would apply differently depending on
who initiated the communication. See id. Communications initiated by an employee
and made to counsel in confidence will be privileged if the employee is seeking legal
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Upjohn furnishes binding precedent only in federal court
cases other than diversity claims. State courts have adopted varied
approaches to the issue of who speaks for the corporation. As of
1997, fourteen states adopted Upjohn or a similar subject-matter
approach; eight adopted some version of the control group test;
the remaining twenty-eight, including North Carolina, had taken
no position by statute, rule, or state court case:'
B.

Work ProductImmunity for the Corporation
In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court questioned the

availability of work product protection to corporations because of
the concern that the doctrine would permit a corporation,
especially one with a large legal staff, to "pull a dark veil of secrecy
over all the pertinent facts it can collect after the claim arises."7
The Court, however, determined that these concerns did not
override the policy considerations that support work product
protection in the corporate context, and explicitly applied the
work product doctrine to corporate counsel.
IV.

IN-HOUSE COUNSEL COMMUNICATIONS AND WORK PRODUCT

"Theoretically, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege,
there is no distinction between an attorney who is employed inhouse and one who is outside the corporate organization."7' " Like
the theoretical underpinnings of the privilege and work product
immunity for corporations generally, however, the equivalence in
advice. See id. If, however, the investigation is initiated by the corporation, factual
communications from corporate employees %,illbe privileged only if they concern the
employee's own conduct vithin the scope of employment and are made to aid
counsel in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct. L. at
872-73; Hamilton, supra note 25, at 641. The Arizona legislature has approved
legislation that would reject the Goodfarb court approach in favor of an
interpretation that is closer to Upjohn. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 642.
73. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 633-46.
74. Hiclnan v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,506 (1947).
75. See id. at 507.
76. Allan D. Ullberg & George A. Kuhlman, Legal Ethics: Current Trends
Concerning In-House Attorney-Client Privilege, SC40 ALI-ABA Course Study
Materials (March 1998), LEXIS, Secondary Legal Library, Combined ALIABA
Course of Study Materials File. See Upjohn Co. v. United States. 449 U.S. 3,3
(1981); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass
1950); RESTATENfENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAw,. GOVERNING LAVw ERS § 73 cmt. i (1993).
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treatment of in-house and outside counsel has proven difficult to
maintain in specific circumstances. During the past thirty years,
corporations have made dramatic changes in how they obtain legal
services. Both the number and the importance of in-house counsel
increased strikingly over this period, although the growth in
numbers of in-house lawyers appears to have slowed in recent
years.77 With this growth in numbers has come an increase in the
sophistication and complexity of matters that are dealt with
routinely by in-house counsel.7" These changes have given rise to
new questions regarding the unique role of the in-house lawyer
within the corporate structure, especially in relation to the
fundamental principle of confidentiality of client information." As
in-house counsel take on more and more prominence-or
notoriety8°--courts are called on to articulate their understanding
of the special status and role that the in-house lawyer fills for an
employer-client.
Courts have sometimes applied stricter standards to inhouse counsel than to outside counsel in determining whether to
protect confidential information, both through attorney-client
privilege and work product immunity." The stricter standards
frequently reflect one or both of two fundamental concerns. The
first is a suspicion that, because they are employees of their client,
and their livelihood depends on that single corporate client, inhouse counsel are not as independent as outside counsel.8 " The
77. John H. Tinney, Partneringand Strategic Trading Alliances Between In-House
and Outside Counsel, PLI Order No. H4-5185 (Mar./Apr. 1994), WL 497 PLI/Lit 525;
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STANFORD L. REv. 277, 277 (1985); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of
CorporateCounsel, 46 EMORY L. J. 1011, 1011-12 (1997).
78. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging
from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 497, 498

(1998); see Chayes & Chayes, supra note 77, at 278.
79. See Samuel R. Miller & Irwin H. Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical
Issuesfor the Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 631, 631-32 (1985).
80. The recent financial failure and bankruptcy filing of Enron Corporation have
drawn unwelcome attention to the roles played by its in-house general counsel and
some of its large legal staff. See, e.g., Miriam Rozen, "An Unenviable Position,"TEX.
LAW., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1; David Hechler, "Enron's Legal Staff Battered, Confused,"
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 2002, at Al.
81. VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.05 at 1-41 ("There is no question that

communications with in-house counsel receive special scrutiny.").
82. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES,
LAWYERING

T14E LAW OF

§ 17.7 at 17-21 (3d ed. 2002); infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.

2002]

CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMUNICATIONS

281

second derives from the fact that in-house counsel are much more
likely than outside counsel to perform a role that mixes legal with
business or other functions," leading courts to resist the extension
of disclosure protections to roles played by counsel outside the
traditional lawyer function. Underlying these concerns is the
foundational worry, discussed above,"4 that the very nature of the
corporate entity creates opportunities in which in-house counsel
may help their corporation clients create a very large "zone of
silence" by taking advantage of confidentiality protections crafted
originally for the benefit of individual clients. The special
questions regarding in-house counsel have emerged in the contexts
of both attorney-client privilege and attorney work product, and
this section will examine courts' treatment of in-house counsel in
both areas.
A.

Independence of In-House Counsel

In upholding the application of the attorney-client privilege
to in-house counsel communications in Upjohn Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court took significant comfort in the
independence required of all lawyers:
The first step in the resolution of any legal problem
is ascertaining the factual background and sifting

through the facts with an eye to the legally
relevant .... "It is for the lawyer in the exercise of
his independent professional judgment to separate

the relevant and important from the irrelevant and
unimportant. The observance of the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the
confidences and secrets of his client not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to
proper representation of the client but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.""
83. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 678;
infra notes 99-178 and accompanying text, supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
84. See supranotes 30-44 and accompanying text.
85. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (19S0) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). In addition, the court placed special reliance on in-house
counsel's role of helping corporations to comply ith the law in an age of increasing
complex regulation. Id. at 392; see 24 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & KENETH W.
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The court thus recognized the ethical duty of independence
that a lawyer, whether in-house or outside, must fulfill in the
performance of his or her services as a lawyer.86 The duty is set
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 5480, at 245 n.37 (1986). See

Amy L. Weiss, Note, In-house Counsel Beware: Wearing the Business Hat Could
Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 393, 402 (citing Alison M. Hill,
Note, A Problem of Privilege;In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege in
the U.S. and the European Community, 27 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 145, 186 (1995))

("In-house attorneys are in a better position than outside counsel to encourage
corporations to comply with the law because they are associated intimately with dayto-day corporate affairs.").
86. Other courts have found support for limiting the privilege to practicing
attorneys in: (1) the courts' supervisory authority over lawyers, RICE, supra note 20, §
3.2; (2) the fact that lawyers are trained in the law and skilled in practice, Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 389 (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) ("[the attorneyclient privilege] is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice,
which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure")); and (3) the requirement that
lawyers abide by the ethics rules to which licensed attorneys must adhere. Vernitron
Med. Products, Inc. v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12613, *325 (D.N.J.
Apr. 29, 1975) (noting that both patent attorneys and patent agents must conform to
the standards of ethical and professional conduct set forth in the Code of Professional
Responsibility adopted by the American Bar Association); Woods v. N.J. Dep't of
Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.N.J. 1993). Every formulation of the requirements for
application of the privilege includes the presence of a lawyer. In North Carolina, for
example, application of the privilege is available only "if the relation of attorney and
client existed at the time the communication was made." State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C.
517, 523-24, 444 S.E.2d 438, 442 (1994) (quoting State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 531,
284 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1981)); Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 142 N.C. App. 18,
32, 541 S.E.2d 782, 791 (2001) (quoting McIntosh, 304 N.C. at 531, 284 S.E.2d 294);
see State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 611-12, 430 S.E.2d 188, 204 (1993) (concluding
that a judge is not an attorney for purposes of the application of the attorney-client
privilege, since a judge cannot engage in private practice in North Carolina); State v.
Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 601, 197 S.E.2d 539, 547 (1973) (noting that the
attorney-client privilege cannot attach to communications with an advisor who had
no right to appear on behalf of a prisoner in court); State v. Smith, 138 N.C. 700, 702,
50 S.E. 859, 860 (1905) (finding the attorney client privilege would not attach if the
advisor could not appear as the prisoner's attorney in court); see also Nemecek v. Bd.
of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 48 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 254,2000 WL 33672978
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2000) (holding that communications with "lay representative" of
professor in university tenure dispute not protected by attorney-client privilege
because representative was not an attorney). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
requires that "[t]he person to whom the communication is made is a member of a bar
of a court, or his subordinate, and in connection with this communication is acting as
a lawyer. ... " Better Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw (In re Allen), 106 F.3d 582, 600

(4th Cir. 1997). In-house counsel normally are not required to maintain bar
membership in every state in which counsel performs services. Paper Converting
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forth in Rule 2.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice."'
In the context of corporate legal representation, the
requirement of independence can perhaps best be seen in the
application of Rule 1.13 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.S The rule sets out the ethical principles that apply to a

lawyer for an organization, such as a corporation,"" and spells out
that a lawyer for a corporation who learns that a corporate officer
is acting in a manner that would violate a legal obligation to the
corporation, or result in a violation of law that might be imputed
to the organization, should consider a number of possible actions
including, "going up the ladder" within the organization,
ultimately to the company's board of directors, in an effort to
rectify the situation."0 If this "internal whistle-blowing""' does not
Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1963 ; -cc RICE, supra
note 20, §§ 3.2, 3.14; VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.05. They are, however, generally
required to be admitted to the bar of at least one state. See United States v.United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D.Mass 1450); RCE,supra note 20, i 3.2
at 9 n.13; VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.05.
87. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUtv

R. 2.1; see also N.C. RE%'ISED

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.2.1 (similarly stated as the analogous ABA rule).
88. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.13: see 1 H\Z,,,RD & HoDES.

supra note 82, § 17.1.
89. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDU.CT R. 1.13.
90. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13; 1 HAZARD & HODES,

supra note 82,§ 17.11-17.12. Rule 1.13(b) pro'ides as follow:s
If a lawyer for an organization l:novs that an officer, employe, or
other person associated with the organization in engaged in action,
intends to act, or refused to act in a matter related to the
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law w.hich reasonably might be
imputed to the organization and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining
how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the
seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and
nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the
organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved,
the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any
other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be
designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of
revealing information relating to the representation to persons
outside the organization. Such measures may include among
others:
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remedy the problem, the rule leaves only one practical alternative
for the attorney-to resign:
If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with
paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on
behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a
refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer may resign or withdraw in
accordance with Rule 1.16.92
Somewhat ironically, the same ethical requirement of
independence for corporate lawyers may result in a perceived lack
of independence of in-house counsel, as opposed to outside
practitioners.93 Resignation from representation of the in-house
counsel's one and only client likely will be an event of substantially
greater magnitude for the in-house lawyer than it would be to a
private practitioner who does work for numerous clients. 94 As one
commentator noted: "To sacrifice the fruits (both present and

(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought

for presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to

the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as
determined by applicable law.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).

91. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 82, § 17.12 at 17-40.
92. N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).
93. Brian D. Forrow, The CorporateDepartment Lawyer: Counsel to the Entity,
34 Bus. LAw. 1797, 1802 (1979).
94. Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving
Independence in CorporateRepresentation, 68 TENN. L. REv. 179, 204 (2001) ("One
of the most salient distinguishing features between inside and outside counsel for the

corporation is the economic dependence of inside counsel on a single client."); see
Rachel S. Arnow Richman, A Cause Worth Quitting For? The Conflict Between
ProfessionalEthics and Individual Rights in Discriminatory Treatment of Corporate
Counsel, 75 IND. L.J. 963, 989-91 (2000); Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of
Corporate Counsel: A Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L. J. 1023, 1027

(1997).
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future) of a career devoted singlemindedly to the affairs
of a single
95
tragedy.
Greek
of
flavor
the
even
client has perhaps
In addition to economic dependence on their corporation
clients for their paychecks, in-house lawyers also may find
opportunities for great financial reward tied to the success of their

employer. This linkage can undermine the perception of lawyer
independence that has undergirded availability of privilege and
work product protection. For example, James Derrick, the general
counsel of Enron Corporation, found significant fortune through
his stock ownership and compensation programs benchmarked to

the performance of the corporation." While good arguments can
be made that there is little difference between in-house counsel
and partners in law firms that have large corporate clients."

questions continue to be raised regarding the policy of applying
the privilege to in-house counsel."

95. Forrow, supra note 93, at 1802; see also 24 WRIGHT & GRAHiAM, supra note
85, § 5480 at 244-45 and n.37.
96. Prior to the bankruptcy filing of Enron Corporation, Derrick sold more than
$12.5 million in Enron stock that he received as part of his compensation package,
according to information reported to the SEC. Rozen, supra note 80, at 1.
97. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHI, supra note 85, § 54S0 at 245 n37. Note in this regard
the questions recently raised in connection with representation of Enron Corporation
by the Houston firm of ,rmson & Elldns, Enron's primary outside counsel. Riva D.
Atlas, Enron's Many Strands: The Law Firm; A Law Firmis 2 Roles Risk Suit by
Enron, Experts Say, N.Y. Tm s, Jan. 29,2002, at Cl.
98. Ryall v. Appleton Electric Co., 153 F.R.D. 660, 662 n.1 (D. Col. 1994) ("For
reasons grounded in the historical foundation underlying the attorney-client
privilege ..... I question the fairly recent expansion of the privilege to encompass
corporate in-house counsel. Nevertheless, applying the law as it is and not as I think
it should be .... ."); see ViLLA, supra note 23, § 1.05. The European Court of Justice,
for example, has ruled that in-house counsel in the European Community are not
entitled to protection of the attorney-client privilege, "based on the assumption that
once attorneys are employed by a corporation they can no longer be independent."
Alison M. Hill, Note, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the Attorney.
Client Privilegein the United States and the European Community, 27 CASE XV. RES. J.
INT'L L. 145, 145-46 (1995). See generally Joseph Pratt, Comment, The Parametersof
the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel at the International Level:
Protectingthe Company's Confidential Information, 20 Nw. J. I1N-T'L L. & BUs. 145
(1999); Maurits Dolmans, Attorney-Client Privilege For In.House Counsel. A
EuropeanProposal,4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125 (1998).
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Function of In-House Counsel: Lawyer or Businessman

Notwithstanding the lingering concerns regarding in-house
counsel independence, the courts in the United States have in
principle settled the issue in favor of applying the attorney-client
privilege to communications to and from in-house lawyers. 9 They
sometimes apply the privilege and work product doctrine
differently, though, to in-house attorneys.
Although he served as "outside" counsel, Joel Dolkart
played multiple roles for Gulf & Western, much like an in-house
counsel in a typical organization."0 His case illustrates the
examination of these concerns by looking at the functions actually
performed by in-house lawyers."' Courts may apply special
scrutiny to the functions performed by in-house counsel in
determining whether the relevant communications were
sufficiently tied to the lawyer's legal, as opposed to business,
financial, or other services and advice.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege and "Legal Advice"
In the Gulf & Western case,0 2 the district court was
troubled that Dolkart "wore several hats": lawyer, director,
corporate secretary, and a member of the company's pension
advisory committee.'0 3 The court was unable to assume that his
"discussions with corporate officials involved legal advice," one of
the foundational elements of attorney-client privilege."° The
problem illustrated by his multi-faceted work for Gulf & Western
is even more serious for in-house counsel.
There has never been any question that privileged
communications must have been made "for the purpose of

99. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950); see RICE,supra note 20,
§ 3.14; VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.05.
100. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 678
(D.D.C. 1981).
101. See generally 518 F. Supp. 675.
102. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
103. 518 F. Supp at 678.
104. Id. at 683.
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obtaining legal assistance."'" - The problem is how to determine
when a communication is for the purpose of legal assistance where
there may be more than one reason for the communcation. The
difficulty is perhaps most easily seen when in-house counsel also
serves as a member of the board of directors of the corporation
client. "' As one corporate lawyer lamented:
[T]he conversation is always muddled: there's a
legal answer and then there's ten minutes of
business answers and then there's five minutes of
legal answers and then there's seven minutes of
business answers, and so on. You can't try to sit
there with two hats, taking them off and putting
them on and taing them off and figuring out how
you are going to document [the distinction]."
This problem also extends to in-house counsel who are not board
members. In-house counsel are "expected to be immersed in the
corporation" functioning as "members of the 'team' responsible
for running the business.""" As valuable team members,
employee-lawyers are inevitably involved in inseparable business
and legal roles.
Courts have formulated various approaches in attempting
to divine the purpose of counsel communications in connection
with applying attorney-client privilege. The Restatement Third of
the Law Governing Lawyers requires that -[a] client must consult
the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance and not
predominantlyfor anotherpurpose."'"' The Restatement ventures
that determining whether the test is met "depends upon the
circumstances," and looks to the extent the lawyer performs legal
and non-legal work, the nature of the communication, and whether
or not the lawyer previously provided legal assistance relating to
105. RESTATEMETNT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOXERNING LA,'ERS § 72 (1993), sce
State v. Mclnstosh, 336 N.C. 517,444 S.E.2d 438 (1994 .
106. Kim, supra note 94,at 239-42.

107. IM.at 19 (quoting Conflict of Interest and Corporate Counsel: Choosing the
Best Path, ACCA Docket, Fall 1993, at 42 (remarks of Norman Krishova)J.
108. Richman, supranote 94,at 991.
109. RESTATENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. c
(1998) (emphasis added).
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the same matter." °
In general, though, the Restatement
characterizes American decisions as applying the privilege if "one
of the significant purposes of a client in communicating with a
lawyer is that of obtaining legal assistance."' Some courts have
applied a "but-for" test in the determination, holding a
communication privileged if it would not have been made but for
the legal advice purpose." 2
Other courts have applied a more stringent analysis, at least
where in-house counsel communications are at issue. In Rossi v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of GreaterNew York, 113 the New York
Court of Appeals examined an internal memorandum from inhouse counsel regarding a defamation claim against Blue Cross.
The potential claimant had challenged language in Blue Cross's
coverage rejection form that labeled certain medical procedures
"experimental" or "not generally recognized by an appropriate
governmental agency."".4 The memorandum was prepared on the
day the defamation suit was served on Blue Cross' and was sent
to the Blue Cross medical director and copied to the company's
general counsel. It covered conversations between the staff
attorney and plaintiff's counsel, conversations between the staff
counsel and the Food & Drug Administration regarding the
110. Id.
111. Id. § 122 cmt. c reporter's note.
112. Reich v Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D.N.J. 1994) (using a "but
for" test, instead of a predominant purpose, in finding that reviews made in the
ordinary course of business for at least two years prior to an accident for the
employer's own internal safety reasons did not qualify for the privilege); see also
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So.2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994) (establishing a
five-pronged test to determine what communications are privileged); First Chicago
Int'l v. United Exch. Co. Ltd., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the
fraud investigation documents were created only because counsel asked for them
to use in providing legal advice, and therefore entitled to the privilege).
113. Rossi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703 (N.Y.
1989).
114. Id. at 704. The plaintiff was a radiologist who performed nuclear magnetic
resonance imaging. Id. Blue Cross allegedly rejected more than 2000 claims from
the plaintiff's patients who were Blue Cross subscribers, by sending them a form that
stated: "Your contract does not cover procedures which are experimental or whose
effectiveness is not generally recognized by an appropriate governmental agency."
Id. The new procedure apparently had been approved by the FDA, but Blue Cross
continued its rejection policy even after the plaintiff notified it of the government
approval. Id.
115. Id.
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plaintiffs medical procedure, the staff lawyer's understanding of
Blue Cross's reimbursement policy and the rejection language, and
the staff lawvyer's opinion and advice regarding the rejection
language." 6 The court held that the memorandum was covered by
the attorney-client privilege, but in so doing held that a privileged
communication must be "primarily or predominantly of a legal
character" to qualify for protection." 7 The court noted that the
Blue Cross staff attorney functioned only as a lawyer for the
company and did not perform any other role, and found persuasive
the fact that the memorandum was prepared on the very day the
lawsuit was received."' In analyzing the applicable law, however,
the court observed:
[U]nlike the situation where a client individually
engages a lawyer in a particular matter, staff
attorneys may serve as company officers, with mixed
business-legal responsibility; whether or not officers,
their day-to-day involvement in their employers'
affairs may blur the line between legal and nonlegal
communications; and their advice may originate not
in response to the client's consultation about a
particular problem but with them, as part of an
ongoing, permanent relationship with the
organization. In that the privilege obstructs the
truth-finding process and its scope is limited to that
which is necessary to achieve its purpose, the need
to apply it cautiously and narrowly is heightened in
the case of corporate staff counsel, lest the mere
participation9 of an attorney be used to seal off
disclosure.11

116. I.

117. Id. at 706. The "predominant purpose" requirement follov;s the English
RESTATEMiENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING L XMWERS § 122 cmt. c
reporter's note (1998) (citing Waugh v. British Rys. Bd., [19S0] A.C. 521 (H.L.)).
118. Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 706.
119. Id. at 705 (internal citations omitted) (quoted in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
GAF Roofing Manufacturing Corp., 1996 WL 29-392, at :-3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25,

view.

1996)).
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In a much discussed 1996 case, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
GAF Roofing Manufacturing Corp.,2 ° the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York applied perhaps the
most stringent test in finding the attorney-client privilege
unavailable to protect communications between in-house
environmental counsel and corporate officers in connection with
the negotiation of an asset purchase agreement. The court found
that counsel's role as a negotiator fell outside the "traditional
function" of a lawyer and that his conversations as part of the
negotiation
process12 1 "involved
business judgments
of
environmental risks."'
The case involved a breach of contract claim by GeorgiaPacific against GAF, which had undertaken to acquire certain
GAF
assets related to Georgia-Pacific's roofing business. 22
refused to close on the properties after a dispute arose with respect
to Georgia-Pacific's responsibility to complete environmental
remediation of one of the properties.'23 Michael Scott, an in-house
environmental lawyer for GAF, had reviewed the environmental
representations and covenants in the proposed asset purchase
agreement. 24 He had expressed concerns to management about
indemnification coverage and other matters and suggested to
senior management ways to negotiate the agreement.'2 Scott later
personally took part in the negotiations with respect to
environmental provisions of the asset purchase agreement,
including the same provisions
that GAF relied on in refusing to
126
close on the purchase.
In the ensuing litigation, Georgia-Pacific sought to ask
Scott three questions in a deposition: (1) what recommendations
had he made to GAF's negotiators as to how the proposed
agreement should be changed and what the impact of the changes
would be; (2) whether he recommended to GAF senior
management that GAF should consider certain options other than
an indemnification; and (3) whether a senior GAF executive had
120. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., 1996 WL 29392 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 25, 1996).
121. Id. at *4-*5.
122. Id.at *1.
123. Id. at *2.
124. Id.at *1.
125. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 1996 WL 29392, at *1.
126. See id.at *1-*2.
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asked him to cancel a meeting that had been scheduled with
Georgia-Pacific lawyers. 27
The district court ruled that none of these communications
were protected by the attorney-client privilege because of Scott's
role as a negotiator rather than a legal advisor:
[I]t is clear that Mr. Scott was not "exercising a
lawyer's traditional function." The record indicates
that Mr. Scott was asked to review GP's proposed
agreement with respect to the environmental
provisions. He then negotiated the environmental
provisions of the agreement, and after execution of
the agreement, he served as negotiator of the
matters to be included in Schedule 1. As a
negotiator on behalf of management, Mr. Scott was
acting in a business capacit'.... Mr. Scott's
averment that he rendered legal advice to
management, although considered, does not
overcome the nature of his role in the transaction as
revealed by his deposition. '2
127. Id.at "2--3.
128. Id at *4-*5 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The decision has
spavned blistering criticism from the ABA and numerous commentators. See, e.g.,
Mark C. Van Deusen, The Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel When
Negotiating Contracts: A Response to Georgia-Pacific Corp. v GAF Roofing
Manufacturing Corp., 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1397 (1998); Weiss, supra note 85;
Jerome J. Shestack, ABA Speaks Out for CorporateCounsel and "The Rule of Lat,, 5
METROPOLITA CORP. COU.NS. 1 (Dec. 1997). WL 12J97 Metro. Corp. Couns. 1;
McNeil, 1997 ABA Sec. of Litig. Rep. 120 (on file with author). In a case based on
what one commentator has labeled .'an almost identical fact situation,' the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Diversey U.S. Holdings,
Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., had no difficulty finding that [the] privilege covered
information gathering and negotiation services provided by in-house counsel."
ROBERT L.

HAIG, SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OLTSIDE

COUNSEL 33-49 (citing Diversey U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp, No. 91 C 6234,
1994 WL 71462 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1994)). In that case, Sara Lee's in-house counsel
participated in negotiating the language to be used in the contract in question and
circulated draft language to various employees to get comments. Diversey, 1994 WL
71462, at *1 (N.D. II1. Mar. 3,1994). The court concluded that:
[t]his strikes us as the gathering of information by an attorney
from the client to enable the attorney to provide competent legal
services-in this case, the drafting of a contract. Drafting legal
documents is a core activity of lawyers, and obtaining
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Georgia Pacific and related cases highlight a difficult problem for
in-house lawyers: most courts will honor a presumption that
outside counsel's communications are for legal advice, but the
same is not true for in-house counsel. 29 In-house counsel must be
particularly aware of the legal advice requirement. 3 Those who
hold multiple offices in the corporate structure may be especially
vulnerable, even in contexts other than negotiation. 3 ' In the final
information and feedback from clients is a necessary part of the
process. Thus, we find that Sara Lee's attorneys were acting in a
legal, not business capacity.
Id. at*1.
129. Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Merideth, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir.
1977), with United States v. Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. May 29, 1996); see VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.16.
130. See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK-PRODUCr DOCTRINE 136, 233 (4th ed. 2001).
Nothing is harder to disentangle in the modern business world
than in-house counsel who gives legal advice but is also intimately
involved with the business operations of the client....
Corporations and in-house counsel need to be aware that not
every communication that they believe will necessarily be
privileged will indeed be safe from compelled disclosure.
Id.
131. At board and other meetings, an in-house counsel who is also a board
member or corporate officer may wish to be cautious not to intermingle his or her
notes regarding legal problems and advice with notes regarding the business matters
discussed at the meeting. See Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 31 F. Supp.
2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining, in a case in which an attorney was a corporation's
vice president for taxes, that "[w]hen a lawyer acts merely to implement a business
transaction or provides accounting services, the lawyer is like any other agent of the
corporation whose communications are not privileged"); Borase v. MIA Com, Inc.,
171 F.R.D. 10, 14 (D. Mass. 1997) (observing in case in which attorney was
corporation's general counsel, former senior vice-president, and corporate secretary
that "[tihe attorney-client privilege attaches only when the attorney acts in that
capacity .... It does not apply when in-house counsel is engaged in nonlegal work."
(citations and internal quotations omitted)). In Kramer v. Raymond Corporation,the
defendant sought to protect as privileged the minutes for its Corporate Product
Liability Management Team. 1992 WL 122856, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1992). The
defendant provided an affidavit from its former general counsel summarizing the
function of the liability management team as "gathering and sharing of information
concerning (a) pending product liability claims, (b) reported accidents which might
lead to product liability claims, and (c) possible actions which might be taken to
minimize or avoid potential product liability claims." Id. at *2. Additionally, former
counsel's affidavit described his role to include providing legal advice to the team and
using information gathered by the team to provide "legal advice to the Corporation
and to assist outside counsel in defending litigation." Id. The court did not find that
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analysis, the legal/business overlap inherent in the job of in-house
counsel makes it extremely difficult for in-house lawyers, and for
those corporate officers and employees who must communicate
with in-house counsel, to know whether their words may later
become part of compelled testimony.
2. Work Product Immunity and "Anticipation of Litigation"
While Georgia Pacific and similar cases have narrowed the
attorney-client privilege that many in-house counsel had relied
upon, the courts have also been careful to examine the function

played by counsel, and particularly in-house counsel, in applying
the work product doctrine. 2 In particular, courts have sought to
distinguish between documents prepared "in anticipation of
litigation" and those prepared in the ordinary course of business 33
and, in so doing, have been willing to find a business-as opposed
to a litigation-purpose in many contexts. 34
The Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor initially
questioned the availability of work product protection to
corporations because of concerns that corporations could unfairly
use their lawyers to keep important "facts" from litigants.3 5 The
Court determined that these concerns did not override the policy
considerations that support work product protection in the
corporate context,'36 and the work product doctrine has

consistently been applied to corporate counsel." 7 Application of
the doctrine in the corporate context, and particularly in situations
all the communications "were made primarily for the purpose of securing legal
advice" and did not allow the privilege for the minutes. Id.
132. See VILLA, supra note 23, § 2.07.
133. See, e.g., Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19. 35, 229 S.E.2d 191, 201
(1976); Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 142 N.C. App. 1, 28, 541 S.E.2d 762,769
(2001).
134. VILLA, supra note 23, §2.07. See Thomas Wilson, Note, The Work Product
Doctrine"Why Have an Ordinary Course of Business Exception?, 198s COLL.. BUS.
REv. 587 (1988).
135. 329 U.S. at 506.
136. Id. at 507.
137. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 776 (N.D. I11.
1962), rev'd on other grounds,320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963). cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963); see Sandberg v. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 355 n.22 (4th Cir. 1992)
vacated, 1993 WL 5246S0 (4th Cir. 1993) (on appellee's unopposed motion to vacate
and remand to district court for dismissal); VILLa, supra note 23, § 2.01.
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involving in-house counsel, though, continues to pose problems for
courts, which remain concerned with38 the potential for abuse by
corporate litigants and their counsel.
Thus, while the work product doctrine does protect
documents prepared by other corporate employees acting under
the direction of counsel in an appropriate context, courts have
expressed a concern that in-house counsel's office not be used to
create a screen against discovery:
[S]ince Rule 26 clearly protects party, and not just
attorney, preparation, the fact that a particular
communication may not go to an attorney does not
prevent its being work product. At the same time, if
an attorney is simply a "mail drop" for the purposes
of trying to create a screen against discovery, and
the content of the document indicates it is neither
work product nor a communication subject to the
attorney-client privilege, the fact that a document is
sent through an attorney cannot prevent its having
to be produced.139
Courts often require an especially strong showing that
documents prepared by in-house counsel were prepared in
anticipation of litigation. Meeting notes taken by in-house counsel
are examined very closely. The court in Redvanly v. NYNEX
Corp. denied work product protection to extensive notes taken by
in-house counsel during a meeting in which a disgruntled
employee was confronted with allegations of wrongdoing and
terminated. 4 ' Notwithstanding specific testimony from counsel
that his notes were prepared in anticipation of litigation both by
the disgruntled employee and another employee, and that they
recorded his mental impressions and opinions, the court found the
work product doctrine inapplicable: "[C]ontrary to defendant's
counsel's representations, the notes are hardly [counsel's] 'mental
impressions and thoughts.' They are, in essence, a running

138. See VILLA, supra note 23, § 2.01.
139. In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 520 (N.D. I11.
1990); see VILLA, supra note 23, § 2.04.
140. 152 F.R.D.460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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transcript of the meeting in abbreviated form....4
After
characterizing testimony by the attorney as "dishonest," the court
ordered production of the notes since "the 'anticipation of
litigation' requirement is not met simply because a document is
prepared in the course of business that a party knows may be
useful in the event litigation should ensue."' 42
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
application of work product protection to in-house counsel's
meeting notes in Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc.,143 a 1992

case involving a claim for breach of directors' fiduciary duties in
connection with a merger. When a group of shareholders filed a
state court action seeking to enjoin the proposed merger, the
general counsel of a bank that proposed to merge with a holding
company subsidiary attended a meeting with officials of the bank,
its proposed merger partner and outside counsel for both
parties."
The meeting was called both to review litigation
strategy wirith respect to the injunction lawsuit and to conduct a
"final review" of the proposed merger prior to a shareholder
meeting scheduled shortly thereafter. 4
At the meeting, the
bank's CEO considered postponing the meeting and obtaining an
independent valuation because of concerns raised regarding the
purchase price; however, counsel for the holding company
persuaded him to go fonvard without a separate valuation.Y The
plaintiff shareholders in a subsequent case sought to obtain the
bank general counsel's notes of this meeting, which concededly
focused in part at least on the pending litigation.'47 The court
ordered production of the notes:
[The defendant] has not shown that the Bank's
general counsel prepared the notes in anticipation
of litigation rather than in the 'ordinary course of
business.' Although the general counsel's affidavit
indicates the purposes of the April 20 meeting, it
14L Id. at 466.
142. Id. at 467.
143. 979 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated, 1993 WL 5246SO (4th Cir. 1993) (on

appellee's unopposed motion to vacate and remand to district court for dismissal).
144. Id. at 34S-49.
145. Id. at 349.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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does not indicate her purpose in making the notes.
The mere fact that a lawsuit was pending does not
transform an attorney's notes into material prepared
in anticipation of litigation. Moreover, while a
general counsel may be involved in litigation
strategy and oversight, it is also possible that her
involvement in the litigation is no different from that
of other corporate officers. In either case, her
purpose in taking the notes is not self-evident and
we find that [defendant] has failed to satisfy its
burden of proof on this issue.'48
Courts have also addressed the "anticipation of litigation"
requirement in the context of internal corporate investigations,
where they have been very careful to scrutinize the claim for
protection where the corporate client has a high public profile or
may have other business reasons for the investigation. 49 In In re
Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation,15 the federal district court
denied work product protection to a report of an internal
investigation performed by counsel. Because of "Kidder's unique
public profile and its vulnerability to the ebb and flow of market
opinion and the predations of its competitors,"' 51 the court
concluded that Kidder would have hired counsel to perform the
52
inquiry "even if no litigation had been threatened at the time.'
The court in In re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Securities
Litigation 53 similarly denied protection to an internal investigation
report because the report would have been prepared even absent
litigation in connection with decisions on firing personnel,
determining the magnitude of the suspected fraud, implementing
new internal control procedures, and reassuring creditors
that the
1 54
company was vigorously addressing the matters at issue.
Although some courts have thus confined work product
protection to documents created "primarily," "principally," or

148. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
149. VILLA, supra note 23, § 2.07.
150. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
151. Id. at 466.
152- Id. at 465.
153. In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
154. Id. at 280-81.
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"exclusively" to assist in litigation," a recent decision by the
v
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Adlmnan, '7
modified this test in a way that could become important for
corporations that claim work product protection. The Adiman
court held that a document need not be prepared primarily or
exclusively to assist in litigation in order to meet the anticipationof-litigation test. Rather, the test is whether "the document can
fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the
prospect of litigation."' 57 Documents prepared for both litigation
and business purposes will be protected unless such documents
"would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective
of the litigation."'' s
Adlman involved a legal analysis prepared at the request of
Sequa Corporation by an attorney-accountant with Arthur
Andersen & Co.'59 In 1989, Sequa was considering a merger of
two of its wholly owned subsidiaries."' Sequa hired Andersen to
evaluate the tax implications of the proposed transaction, and
Andersen's attorney-accountant prepared a detailed memorandum
that considered likely IRS challenges to the transaction, analyzed
possible legal theories and strategies that Sequa could adopt in
response, recommended means of structuring the transaction, and
made predictions regarding the likely outcome of litigation. '
Sequa proceeded with the transaction.b"2 On audit, the IRS
requested the Andersen analysis and Sequa cited the work product
doctrine in refusing to turn it over. ' The district court twice
denied Sequa's claim of work product protection: first on the basis
that the document "was prepared for litigation based on actions or
events that had not yet occurred at the time of its creation" and,
after the Court of Appeals rejected this rationale,'" on the ground
155. See VILLA, supra note 23, § 2.07, n.97 (citing several eases).
156. United States v. Adlnan, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
157. Id. at 1202.
158. Id. at 1202; see Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Try 3 Bldg. Services, Inc., 1993
WL 729735, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1998) (discussing both the 1995 and the 1993
Second Circuit Adlman cases).
159. Adinan, 134 F.3d at 1195.
160. Id.

161. Id. at 1195.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1196.
164. United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495,1501 (2d Cir. 1995).
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65
that the analysis was not prepared "in anticipation of litigation. 1
On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled in Sequa's favor, rejecting the
"primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation" test in favor of its
"because of' test in determining
whether a document is prepared
66
in anticipation of litigation.
The court identified as a question of first impression in the
Second Circuit, "whether [the work product doctrine] is
inapplicable to a litigation analysis prepared by a party or its
representative in order to inform a business decision which turns
on the party's assessment of the likely outcome of litigationexpected
to result from the transaction."'67 Applying the doctrine only to
documents prepared primarily to assist in litigation, the court said,
would exclude any analysis prepared to aid the business decision
with respect to a proposed transaction.'68 The court thus preferred
the "because of' approach articulated in the Wright & Miller
federal procedure treatise:

The Wright & Miller "because of' formulation
accords with the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3)
and the purposes underlying the work product
doctrine. Where a document is created because of
the prospect of litigation, analyzing the likely
outcome of that litigation, it does not lose
protection under this formulation merely because it
is created69 in order to assist with a business
1
decision.
The Adlman decision has been described as a significant
expansion of the applicability of the work product doctrine.'
Still, the issue of when documents are prepared in anticipation of
litigation will continue to be particularly vexing for in-house

165. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998).
166. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1197-98.
167. Id. at 1197 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 1198-99.
169. Id. at 1202.
170. See, e.g., Harvey Kurzweil, Paul J. Bschorr, & Daniel S. Goldsmith, Second
Circuit Interprets and Potentially Expands Work Product Protection, WL 12 No. 7
INSIGHTS 27 (1998); Charles M. Yablon & Steven S. Sparling, United States v.
AdIman: Protectionfor CorporateWork Product?,64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 627 (1998).
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counsel."' In a case decided six years before Adinan, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals advanced an apparently more limited

"because of' test, holding that the "driving force" behind
preparation of a document is the key inquiry:
The document must be prepared because of the

prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an
actual claim or a potential claim following an actual
event or series of events that reasonably could result

in litigation. Thus, we have held that materials
prepared in the ordinary course of business or
pursuant to regulatory requirements or for other

non-litigation purposes are not documents prepared
in anticipation of litigation within the meaning of
Rule 26(b)(3).... Following any industrial accident,
it can be expected that designated personnel ,ill
171. Mount Vernon, 1998 WL 729735, at *5. See Granite Partners v. Bear, Steams
& Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court in Granite Partnersordered
production of notes of witness interviews. %aluation analyses, and other documents
prepared by agents and consultants of a bankruptcy trustee e en though they were
prepared "because of" litigation, since the trustee had published a report that relied
on the documentation and thereby waived the protection by placing the documents
"at issue," and because the plaintiff had overcome the presumption of protection by
showing substantial need for the documents. 184 F.R.D. at 55-56. The court relied
on the reasoning of the In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litiqation, 16S F.RtD. 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), and In re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Securities Litigation, 161
F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), cases to deny the protection, and explained application
of the Adlman precedent as follows:
It may well be said that the effect of Adhnan is to enforce the work
product privilege even if there is a dual purpose for the creation of
the materials. However, even if the documents at issue were to fall
within Adlian's interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3), that would not
end the inquiry. Indeed, the Adlinan court confirmed that:
although a finding under this test that a document is prepared
because of the prospect of litigation w;arrants application of Rule
26(b)(3), this does not necessarily mean that the document w~ill be
protected against discovery. Rather, it means that a document is
eligible for work-product privilege. The district court can then
assess whether the party seeking discovery has made an adequate
showing of substantial need for the document and an inability to
obtain its contents elsewhere without undue hardship....
Furthermore, Adiman does not deal with the waiver issue
presented here.
GranitePartners,184 F.R-D. at 53.
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conduct investigations, not only out of a concern for
future litigation, but also to prevent reoccurrences,
to improve safety and efficiency in the facility, and
to respond to regulatory obligations. Determining
the driving force behind the preparation of each
requested document is therefore required in
resolving a work product immunity question.'
The courts of North Carolina also have applied a "because
of' test to this question, albeit one that takes into account the
"purpose" for creation of the document. In Cook v. Wake County
Hospital System, Inc., 73 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
ordered production of a form accident report prepared by a
hospital employee following a doctor's serious slip-and-fall near
the hospital's intensive care unit. The court denied work product
protection for the accident report:
Here defendant's accident reporting policy exists to
serve a number of nonlitigation, business purposes.
These business purposes impose a continuing duty
on hospital employees to report any extraordinary
occurrences within the hospital to risk management.
These duties exist whether or not the hospital
chooses to consult its attorney in anticipation of
litigation. Here, absent any other salient facts, it
cannot be fairly said that the employee prepared the
accident report because of the prospect of litigation.
In short, the accident report would have been
compiled, pursuant to the hospital's policy,
regardless of whether [plaintiff] intimated a desire
to sue the hospital or whether litigation was ever
anticipated by the hospital. 74
A very recent North Carolina case relied primarily on
Cook to address the issue in the context of insurance company
investigative reports. In Evans v. United Services Automobile
172. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal, 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
1992); see Yablon & Sparling, supra note 170, at 644-45.
173. 125 N.C. App. 618, 482 S.E.2d 546 (1997).
174. Cook, 125 N.C. App at 625,482 S.E.2d at 551-52 (emphasis added).

2002]

CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMUNICATIONS

301

Association,175 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that an

insurance company's entries in a "claims diary" and other
investigative reports and materials are not entitled to work

product immunity unless they v ere prepared after a decision by

the insurer to deny coverage. 176 The court did not discuss Adiman,

relying instead on the "ordinary course of business exception" to
work product protection:

Here, defendants carried out the investigative
process and ultimately denied plaintiff's claim. It

appears that the investigation stage of the claims
process is one carried out in the ordinary course
of an insurer's business . . . Until defendants

determined that their homeovners' policy did not
provide coverage to plaintiff, we cannot say as a
matter of law that defendants "reasonably"
anticipated litigation. Consequently, we do not
believe that material prepared in the course of the
investigatory process is normally entitled to the
Rule 26 qualified work product immunity.'"

Thus, in spite of the expansion of work product immunity
apparently heralded by Adiman, the availability of the protection
remains far from certain in the corporate context, especially as it
may apply to documents and reports prepared' mby in-house
attorneys as part of their normal business "routine. 1
175. Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 142 N.C. App. IS,541 S.E.2d 782 (2001).
176. Id. at 30-31,541 S.E.2d at 790.
177. Id. at 30, 541 S.E.2d at 790; see Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Try 3 Bldg.
Servs., Inc., 1998 XVL 729735 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1993). The court in Mount Vernon
similarly held that investigative reports prepared for an insurance company were not
protected by the work product doctrine in a coverage dispute v.here the investigation
was carried out before the claim was referred to the insurer's counsel and before the
company issued a reservation of rights as to the coverage issue. 1998 WL 729735
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1998). The court noted the holding in Adlinan, but found
application of the doctrine to investigative reports prepared for insurance companies
"particularly troublesome because it is the routine business of insurance companies
to investigate and evaluate claims and to defend their insureds against third-party
claims." Id at "5.
178. In-house counsel should also consider the folloving cases: Guy v. United
Healthcare Corp., 154 F.R.D. 172, 181 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (noting that an attorney's
draft of the minutes of a board meeting may not be protected by the work product
doctrine if the draft and the subject matter of the meeting are not connected to the
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V. PRIVILEGE AND THE REGULATED FINANCIAL INSTITUTION

If it is available, the attorney-client privilege is an absolute
privilege. 79' The rationale is that qualifications to the privilege
would make its application unpredictable. Without predictability,
clients would lose confidence in the privilege, thus defeating the
purpose of encouraging full and frank disclosure.'80 In the Gulf &
Western decision discussed above, however, the District Court
made clear its view that the SEC, in its role as "protector of the
public interest," may be able to show "good cause" that would
justify requiring disclosure even if the privilege were deemed to
apply.'8 ' Not surprisingly, other regulatory agencies share the Gulf
& Western court's view of the importance of the public interest
they are attempting to serve. For example, in the Comptroller's
Handbook used by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the agency instructs its examiners to request privileged materials
when a regulated bank's "capital and earnings are exposed to
material risk, or when the bank's exposure is otherwise considered
significant."' 82 The Handbook also confirms the Comptroller's
view that "a bank that discloses privileged information to an
examiner during an examination does not waive its privileges. ' 83
threat of anticipated litigation); Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 308-09 (M.D.
Ga. 1994) (stating that work product of "in-house experts" likely to be afforded less
protection and that legal department databases that manage and track the status of
claims against the corporation are protectable work product); Carey-Canada, Inc. v.
Cal. Union Ins. Co., 118 F.R.D. 242, 246 (noting that preliminary drafts of litigation
footnotes prepared by in-house counsel that appear in a corporation's annual report
are usually drafted with the pending litigation in mind, and thus are protected under
the work product doctrine); Johnston v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 89, 9293 (E.D. La. 1993) (holding in-house attorney's participation on a corporate
committee, such as an ERISA plan committee, does not render the deliberations and
minutes of the committee's meetings protected work product).
179. Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 35, 229 S.E.2d 191, 201 (1976) ("The
trial court should take care in its supervision of further discovery to protect fully
defendant's attorney-client privilege. This protection is absolute under Rule
26 .... "); see supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
180. See RICE, supra note 20, § 2.2; VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.03 [B].
181. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 686
(1981).
182. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Evaluating Other Legal
Matters, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, 2000 WL 226429 (O.C.C.).
183. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,

Access to Privileged

Materials, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, 2000 WL 226431 (O.C.C.); see also In the

Matter of David Paul, Former Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and
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It then sets forth certain steps for the examiner and counsel to take
in order to preserve the privilege, which include exchanging
written communications identifying the materials being provided
and explaining that the materials are being provided pursuant to
the Comptroller's examination authority." Responding to the
concern that disclosure to the Comptroller would constitute a
waiver of the privilege, thus opening the door for required
disclosure to other parties, the Comptroller assures counsel that
the disclosure is not voluntary and thus does not constitute a
waiver) 5

It is not clear, however, that the agency, simply by its oV
pronouncement, has the power or authority to determine whether
the disclosure will constitute a waiver.""

In In re Leslie Fay

7 the Federal District Court
Companies, Inc. Securities Litigation,"'

for the Southern District of New York refused to apply the
Controlling Shareholder of Centrust Bank, a State Savings Bank, No. OTS AP92-66
(O.T.S.) (July 8, 1992), 1992 WL 560965 (refusing to stay depositions on basis of
alleged violation of attorney-client privilege, noting that specific objections can be
raised during course of depositions and that the ALJ involved has ordered that
information from depositions vill be disclosed only to OTS enforcement personnel
and vll not be shared with the DOJ).
184. OFFICE OFTHE COMPTROLLER OFTHE CURRENCY, supra note 183.
185. See Bank Examiners: Examination Authority, OCC Interpretive Letter (Dec.
3, 1991), 1991 WL 338409 (suggesting that banks place an "'appropriate legend" on
documents furnished to the OCC in order to clarify involuntary disclosure and refute
waiver claim).
186. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that voluntary disclosure to the SEC and DOJ in course
of investigation waived privilege even though SEC regulations said that information
would be kept confidential and noting circuit split with regard to vshether disclosure
to government waives privilege); see also Anne C. Flannery & Jennifer S. Milano,
The Confitsion Continues: Protection of Internal Corporate Investigation Materials
Under the Attorney-Client Privilegeand Work ProductDoctrine,Revisited, PLI Order
No. B4-7206 (Nov. 1997), WL 1023 PLIJCorp 519, 527-38 (discussing the unsettled
case law regarding internal investigations and privileges). Exemption 8 of the federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exempts from disclosure information
"contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision
of financial institutions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (2001)); see also McCullough v. FDIC, 1
Gov't Disclosure Service (Prentice-Hall) 80,194 at 80,495 (D.D.C. 19S0) (holding
that all records, regardless of source, in the possession of the regulating agency and
related to a bank's financial condition and operations are exempt from disclosure
under the FOIA). Therefore, financial institutions cannot convincingly assert that
disclosure to a regulatory agency will automatically make the information available
to the general public, which again weakens the claim of attorney-client privilege.
187. In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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attorney-client privilege to an internal audit report prepared by
counsel because the report had been produced to the SEC and the
United States Attorney's Office. 8' Similarly, in In re Kidder
89
Peabody Securities Litigation,1
the same court ruled that
production of an internal report to the SEC waived the privilege.' 9
Apparently in response to the inconsistent and
unpredictable court approach to the question of waiver, a bill was
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives that would have
codified that disclosure to a regulatory agency does not constitute
a waiver.' 9' In 1999, the Federal Reserve Board wrote in support
of the proposed Bank Examination Report Privilege Act that the
legislation would "overcome the present reluctance of many
institutions to disclose information."' 92 As a practical matter, the
fact that heavily regulated entities, such as financial institutions,
have frequent contact and interactions with their governing
agencies may result in practical pressure to disclose "privileged
materials." The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was not
hesitant about flexing its muscles to obtain materials, some of
which were alleged to be protected by privilege, from the law firm
of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler and several of its
individual partners in the context of the failure of Lincoln Savings

188. Id. at 283-84.

189. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
190. Id. at 472-73. In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Willkie, Farr &
Gallagher, the court found a waiver when an internal investigation report prepared
by an outside law firm was turned over to the client's accountants in order to obtain
an unqualified audit opinion. 1997 WL 118369, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 1997). In
In re Woolworth Corp. Securities Class Action Litigation, however, the court reached
a different result, finding no waiver of the privilege even though an internal
investigation report was produced to the SEC, because the plaintiff had equal access
to the materials and witnesses used to prepare the report. 1996 WL 306576, at *2-*3
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996). There is also authority to the effect that no waiver would
result where production of a communication to a third party is protected by a
confidentiality agreement. Salomon Bros. Treasury Litigation v. Steinhardt Partners
(In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993); see Gary G. Lynch,
Internal Investigations,PLI Order No. B4-7239 (Nov. 1998), WL 1085 PLI/Corp 369,
397.

191. Depository Institution Regulatory Streamlining Act of 1999, H.R. 1585, 106th
Cong. (1999) (introduced April 27, 1999).
192. Depository Institution Regulatory Streamlining Actof 1999: Hearing on H.R.
1585 Before the House Subcomm. on Finl. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm.
on Banking and Fin. Serv., 106th Cong. 58 (1999) (prepared statement of Laurence
H. Meyer, Member, Bd. Of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.). The bill did not pass.
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and Loan Association. 9 3 In March 1991, the OTS initiated a $275
million enforcement action against Kaye Scholer, freezing the law
firm's assets for six days until the firm agreed to pay the
government $41 million in fines."t 4 In this and similar cases against

other law firms, the OTS and other agencies argued that "public
policy" demands that different standards apply to federally
regulated institutions and their legal counsel." - With such history
in mind, federally regulated institutions and their counsel may be
reluctant to assert the privilege in circumstances where it
otherwise would bar disclosure.
Courts have occasionally examined such agency efforts to
qualify the attorney-client privilege. In Texas Utilities Electric Co.
v. Marshall,' 6 the Texas Court of Appeals addressed an appeal by
Texas Utilities of a trial court order that compelled production of
certain documents related to the construction of the Comanche
Peak Steam Electric Station, a two-unit nuclear power plant.","
Texas Utilities was the majority owner of the nuclear plant and
was embroiled in litigation with the minority owners, including the
Texas Municipal Power Agency." : In denying application of the
attorney-client privilege, the trial court had stated:
The fact that we are engaged in the construction of a
nuclear power plant creates ... such a trusteeship

and such a fiduciary relationship, not merely inter se,
but as between all the owners as a group and the
public whose interest is vital and is at stake in this

matter. That the failure to disclose this information
would be a violation of the trust that the public must
193. LISSA L. BROOMaE & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
FINANCIAL SERVICE AcTrIvi'ES 558-66 (2001).

REGULATI N OF Bvrn

194. Id. at 558 (quoting James 0. Johnston, Jr. & Daniel Sehott Schecter,
Introduction:Kaye, Scholer and the OTS-Did Anyone Go Too Far?, bbtS. CAL. L.
REv. 977 (1993)).
195. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Mapping the Mifield: The Applicable
Ethics Rules and Conflicting Duties, PLI Order No. B4-7009 (June 15, 1992), WL 779
PLL(Corp. 53; Ed Hendricks & Mary Berkheiser, Where Were the Lai-qers?, 18
LmGATION 30 (Summer 1992). The Kae Scholer order likely rested on the OTS's
view of the law firm's duty to volunteer information to the agency, as if the agency
were a court under Model Rule 3.9. See VILLA, supra note 23, § 3.9.
196. Texas Utils. Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 739 S.W2d 665 (Tex. App. 19S7).
197. l at 666.
198. Id
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have in those entities that are licensed to carry on
nuclear power generating operations. The Court
will not permit that.'99
The court of appeals reversed, finding that "[n]o 'public interest'
exception exists" under the Texas law of attorney-client
privilege.2"°
Also illustrative is Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph
Company v. Deason,20 ' a 1994 case decided by the Florida
Supreme Court. In Southern Bell, the Florida Office of Public
Counsel asked the Florida Public Service Commission to
investigate allegations that Southern Bell had falsified information
regarding its compliance with certain provisions of the Florida
Administrative Code. 2 The investigation was subsequently
consolidated with a pending rate case, and the Office of Public
Counsel filed various motions to compel the production of
documents from Southern Bell.2" 3 When the Commission ordered
Southern Bell to produce all requested documents, Southern Bell
asked the Florida Supreme Court to quash the Commission orders
on the ground that the documents were protected by the attorneyclient privilege. °4
The court held that Southern Bell employees' statements to
in-house counsel were protected by the attorney-client privilege,
rejecting the Commission's argument that Southern Bell, as a
regulated entity, did not have the full attorney-client privilege that
was recognized in the Upjohn case.20 5 The court stated that "[the
Commission] cannot exercise its regulatory power at the expense
of destroying the corporate attorney-client privilege. 20 6 Citing
two previous cases involving the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, the
Public Service Commission had asserted that regulated entities
have an obligation to comply with governing rules and regulations,
and that, as a statutorily created regulatory agency, the
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 667.
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381-82 & n.9.
Id. at 1382.
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Commission has the duty to ensure Southern Bell's compliance
with the law. 07 The Southern Bell court acknowledged the policy
interests at stake, but noted that all companies operating in the
United States are regulated by one or more government
agencies, including the IRS and, often, the SEC.:"3 Recognizing a
"regulated entity" exception to the attorney-client privilege could
ultimately lead to elimination of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate context, and thus the court concluded that a company's
regulated status does not entitle its regulating body to full access to
its confidential communications.:"
In at least one context, though, the privilege has been
"qualified." While a governmental attorney-client privilege has
generally been recognized, 20 the absolute nature of the attorneyclient privilege has become far less certain in that context. In In re
Lindsey,2 ' the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit
Bruce Lindsey, as Deputy White House Counsel, to assert
government attorney-client privilege to avoid responding to a
federal grand jury involved in a federal criminal investigation
regarding the Whitewater and Lewinsky matters that ultimately
led to impeachment hearings for President Clinton.12 In refusing
to prevent disclosure, the court emphasized that federal
evidentiary privileges should be narrowly construed and that their
application to government lawyers requires the existence of a
"'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of

207. See S. Bell TeL & TeL Co., 632 So. 2d 1377, 1381-S2 (Fla. 1994). 13S1-.2

(citing Consol. Gas Supply Corp., 17 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep (CCH) 9 3
(Dec. 2, 1981) and In re Notification to Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. Concerning
Investigation by CBS of Incidents of "Staging" by its Employees of Television Nevs
Programs, 45 F.C.C.2d 119 (1973) (noting that the regulating agency has a duty to
protect the public interest and ensure compliance with the Natural Gas Act)); see
also Texas Utils. Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 739 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App. 1987) (rejecting
argument that the attorney-client privilege should be "set aside" because of public
interest when party was seeking disclosure from a regulated nuclear power plant).
208. S.Bell TeL & TeL Co., 632 So. 2d at 1382 & n.9.
209. Id.
210. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony). 158 F.3d 1263. 1269
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1); RESTATEMENT (THiRD)
OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
211. Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F-Id 910 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that the White House could not invoke any form of government
attorney-client privilege to withhold information from federal grand jury).
212. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278.
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utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth."'213 Lindsey
was purportedly acting in the role of attorney, with the Office of
the President as his client." 4 The court distinguished government
attorneys from members of the private bar," 5 particularly in the
context of investigations of federal criminal offenses, and
especially as they relate to offenses committed by those in the
government. Unlike private attorneys, who are charged only with
representing their clients to the best of their ability, the
government lawyer has an additional and overriding duty:
With respect to investigations of federal criminal
offenses, and especially offenses committed by those
in government, government attorneys stand in a far
different position from members of the private bar.
Their duty is not to defend clients against criminal
charges and it is not to protect wrongdoers from
public exposure. The constitutional responsibility
of ... all members of the Executive Branch, is to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."2 6
It is difficult to predict whether courts would sanction
further qualifications of the attorney-client privilege in the
regulated industry context. Whether or not this occurs, in-house
lawyers must face a huge practical problem: denying to the
regulators, with whom they are required to deal virtually on a daily
basis, access to materials that may be helpful and important to
those regulators in carrying out their duties. The result is another
very significant complication for the in-house lawyer and his or her
client in predicting what communications will remain confidential.

213. Id. at 1268 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)
(Frankfurter J., dissenting)).

214. See id.
215. Id. at 1271-72. Note that President Clinton's conversations with his personal
counsel, the same conversations that were had with Lindsey, remained fully protected
by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1282.
216. Id. at 1272 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
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VI. SPECIAL SITUATIONS

This section highlights a few special circumstances in which

in-house counsel should take special care to consider whether their
communications and reports are protected.
A.

InternalInvestigations
The

Upjohn case

considered

a

voluntary

internal

investigation conducted by a corporation's general counsel, and
the Supreme Court utilized the encouragement of such voluntary

compliance efforts as the primary rationale for its decision to
uphold

the

application

of the

attorney-client

privilege. 2 '

Companies are using internal investigations more and more
frequently to deal with allegations of corporate misconduct. " Not

only does the Upjohn rationale support such steps, but there are
other strong incentives for corporations to conduct their own
investigations. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer the hope
of a reduced sentence for the organization if offenses are promptly
self-reported before they are discovered by third parties.2 9

Government agencies, such as the SEC, have effectively used a

"carrot

and stick" approach to encourage

compliance efforts."
decision

such voluntary

The Delaware Chancery Court's 1996

in In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative

Litigation"' clarified that directors have a duty to monitor
corporate operations and take steps to see that the corporation is
in compliance with applicable laws.

217. Cohn, supra note 27, at 746-47.
218. Flannery & Milano, supra note 186, at 523.
219. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§
8C2.50f (C25(g)tl)
231),
,
availableat http'./lwwvwv.ussc.gov/2001guidICHAP,.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2C2).
220. See, e.g., In the Matter of Dai;,.a Securities America, Inc., and William M.
Brachfeld, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31924 (Feb. 25, 1993), WL 53 SEC Docket
1517; see Anne C. Flannery & Katherine M. Pollk, BetCwen a RoCk and a Hard Place
Internal Corporate Investigations and the Attorney.Client Priviege, PLI Order No.
B4-7141 (Oct.Nov. 1996), WL 963 PLIlCorp 585; Joseph T. McLaughlin & J. Kevin
McCarthy, CorporateInternal Investqations-Legal Privilcgesand Ethical Issues in
the Employment Law Context, SD06 ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials 991, 99394 (1998), LEXIS, Secondary Legal Library, Combined ALIABA Course of Study
Materials File; Lynch, supra note 190, at 373-74.
221. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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While Upjohn confirms that the attorney-client privilege
applies to communications made in the course of an internal
investigation, the actual application of the privilege in that setting
remains problematic. For instance, in In re Allen,222 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court finding that
the privilege was not available to protect communications in an
investigation conducted by an attorney because the attorney's
duties were merely "investigative."223 The lower court apparently
believed that if a client retains an attorney to perform the
'rudimentary' task of conducting an investigation, that assignment
can never constitute legal work and so the attorney-client privilege
does not protect communications
between the client and the
' 224
investigating attorney."
In addition to the questioning of the legal advice
requirement illustrated by the district court in In re Allen,225 and
the potential for waiver when internal investigation reports are
disclosed to third parties, 226 in-house counsel may confront difficult
issues when former employees of the corporation have
information that could be important in connection with a matter
under investigation. The Supreme Court in Upjohn declined to
decide whether communications with former employees are
covered by the privilege.227 Most courts since Upjohn have held
2 s
that the privilege does apply in the case of former employees.
Language in a concurring opinion in Upjohn, however, supports
the proposition that the privilege should be limited to situations in
which the former employee is communicating with counsel at the
direction of management, concerning matters within the scope of
his or her employment, so that the corporation can obtain legal
advice.229 Other courts have gone even further and required a
222. Better Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw (In re Allen), 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.
1997).
223. Id. at 603.
224. Id. at 601.
225. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 175-190 and accompanying text.
227. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1980); see VILLA, supra
note 23, § 1.03[C].
228. See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 605-06; see VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.03[C].

229. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see VILLA, supra note
23, § 1.03[C] & n.31; see also Nakajima v. Gen. Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100, 104
(D.D.C. 1994) (refusing to apply the privilege where former employee's
communication with counsel was three years after employee left defendant's
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showing that the corporation had the legal authority to direct the
former employee to cooperate in counsel's investigation, thus
making it advisable to include in employment contracts and
severance agreements a contractual undertaking by each employee
to cooperate with the company's counsel in any internal
investigation." Also, in order to prevent a waiver of the privilege
by a former employee, the corporation should instruct employees
and former employees not to communicate with other attorneys
regarding corporate business without the corporation's consent."'
B.

Subsidiaries

Another special circumstance arises in the context of
communications between parents and subsidiaries. Often, the
same in-house counsel acts as attorney for the parent and for the
subsidiary, or counsel for a subsidiary reports both to the CEO of
the subsidiary and to the general counsel of the parent. 2 The
general rule that applies in this situation tends to avoid these
complications. The sharing of communications between a
corporate parent and its subsidiary does not, in and of itself,
compromise the availability of the privilege, because the parent
and the subsidiary have a common interest in the protection of
such information. 3 "The universal rule of law, expressed in a
variety of contexts, is that the parent and subsidiary share a
community of interest, such that the parent (as well as the
subsidiary) is the 'client' for purposes of the attorney-client

employment, and where defendant had not alleged employee was questioned in
order for defendant to obtain legal advice).

230. See Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 1985 WL 2917, at 5-.8 (ND. Ill.
Oct. 1, 1985); Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Tech., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 93-95
(S.D. Cal. 1987); REsTATE.iENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GovERNi4NG Lxw'%ERS § 73
cmt. e (1998): VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.03 [C] & n.4.
231. See Thomas W. Hyland & Molly Hood Craig, Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine in the Corporate Setting, 62 DEF. CouNS. J.553,557 (1995).
232- See John T. Hundley, White Knights, Pre-Nuptial Confidences, and the
Morning After: The Effect of Transaction-RelatedDisclosureson the Attorney-Client
and Related Privileges,5 DEPAUL Bus. LJ.59, 63-b4 (1992) (providing a hypothetical

example of such a problem).
233. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172
(D.S.C. 1974); see VILLA, supra note 23, § 1.03[D]: Hundley, supra note 232, at 82-83;
Andrew R. Taggart, Comment, Parent-SubsidiaryCommunicationsand the AttorneyClient Privilege, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 315,319-22 (1)98).
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'
privilege."234
When a subsidiary is sold, however, or when control
of a corporate subsidiary passes to new management, the issue of
who controls the privilege becomes more complicated. Generally,
control over the privilege is held to pass to new management of
the subsidiary in a sale context; the new managers can waive or
assert the privilege, even as to communications by former officers
and directors, without the consent of the former parent.235
A 1988 case decided in Illinois illustrates the problems that
can arise from this rule. In Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter
Travenol Labs, Inc., a corporate parent sold the stock of its
subsidiary. 36 Following the sale, the purchaser sued the selling
parent for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, alleging that the selling parent had
concealed the existence of a lawsuit against the parent and the
subsidiary by a former officer of the subsidiary.237 In that action,
which had been settled and dismissed-with the court file placed
under seal upon request of all parties-the selling parent had
made allegations that raised serious questions about the business
of the subsidiary and other matters. 38 The purchaser of the
subsidiary sought to compel production of sixteen documents,
primarily memoranda between the subsidiary's officers and inhouse attorneys in the selling parent's legal department, which had
represented both the parent and the subsidiary prior to the sale.239
The purchaser caused the subsidiary, which it controlled after the
sale, to waive the privilege with respect to these communications,

234. Glidden Co. v. Jandernoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 472 (W.D. Mich. 1997); see

§ 73 cmt. d (1998).
235. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

Bass Public Ltd. Co. v. Promus Cos., 868 F. Supp. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Medcom
Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

"When ownership of a corporation... passes to successors, the transaction carries
with it authority concerning or waiving the privilege. ... [C]ommunications from
directors, officers, or employees of the acquired organization to lawyers who
represent only the predecessor organization... may no longer be covered by the
privilege." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. k
(1998).
236. 689 F. Supp. 841, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1988)

237. Id. at 842 & n.3.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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and the selling parent sought to invoke the privilege."' The court
held that the privilege had been waived:
"[W]hen control of a corporation passes to new
management, the authority to assert and waive the
corporation's attorney client privilege passes as well.
New managers installed as a result of a takeover,
merger, loss of confidence by shareholders, or
simply normal succession, may waive the attorney
client privilege with respect to communications
made by former officers and directors. Displaced
managers may not assert the privilege over the
wishes of current managers ....
The result in Medcom has been criticized as overly
formalistic. 42 In Medcom, the new managers of the assets of the
sold subsidiary inherited control of the privilege even though,
prior to the stock sale, the subsidiary had transferred the great
majority of its assets to third parties, including its parent. 3 Had
the transaction been effected as a sale of assets, rather than a sale
of stock in the subsidiary, the selling parent would normally have
retained control over the privilege and the right to decide whether
to waive it."4 Additionally, it may be possible for the selling
parent to retain at least shared control over the waiver of the
privilege by contract.2"45 Thus, counsel should consider whether to

240. Id. at 842.
24L Id. at 842-43 (quoting Commidity Futures Trading Comm'n, 471 U.S. 343.349
(1985)).
242. Taggart, supra note 233, at 331-33.
243. See Hundley, supra note 232, at 94.
244. See, e.g., Cheeves v. S. Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 126, 13t) (M.D. Ga. 19S9). Even

in an asset sale, the privilege may be deemed waived if documents evidencing the
privileged communication are transferred to the purchaser of the assets as part of the
selling subsidiary's files. Hundley, supra note 232, at 94-95. And where, as in
Medcom, the privilege issue arises where the purchased subsidiary's new
management alleges fraud by the selling parent, the general crimeffraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege may prevent assertion of the privilege by the seller in any
event. See MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 95, VILLA, supra note 23, §§ 1.22[C], 1.26.
245. See Bass Public Ltd. Co. v. Promus Cos., 86 F. Supp 615, 621; VILLA, supra
note 23, § 1.22[C; Taggart, supra note 232, at 333-34 & n.95.
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include in a stock sale agreement a provision reserving the
attorney-client privilege for the selling parent.246
VII. CONCLUSION

The managers and officers of Gulf & Western who
conversed day-in-day-out with Joel Dolkart, their general counsel,
likely believed that all of their conversations would always remain
confidential. They were disappointed, at least in part, for reasons
that are increasingly relevant in in-house legal practice. The
expanding role of in-house lawyers for corporations generally, and
for regulated financial institutions in particular, has given rise to
numerous complications in relation to the application of both the
attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. Courts
continue to harbor suspicions regarding possibly inappropriate
efforts by corporations to use their lawyers, especially their
employee-lawyers, to shield from disclosure communications and
reports that will be important in providing just decisions. These
suspicions have led to numerous restrictions and qualifications on
the privilege and the immunity that would not otherwise apply to
private practitioners. In-house counsel must be especially wary of
these complications as they seek to understand the rules under
which they work and to balance the need for full and frank
disclosure with their corporate clients against the possibility that
unfairly damaging information may come to light in unexpected
ways.

246.

VILLA,

supra note 23, § 1.22[C].

